Abstract--Artificial Intelligence (AI) is expected to be an integral part of next-generation AI-native 6G networks. With the prevalence of AI, researchers have identified numerous use cases of AI in network security. However, there are very few studies that analyze the suitability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in network security. T o fill this gap, we examine the suitability of LLMs in network security, particularly with the case study of STRIDE threat modeling. We utilize four prompting techniques with five LLMs to perform STRIDE classification of 5G threats. From our evaluation results, we point out key findings and detailed insights along with the explanation of the possible underlying factors influencing the behavior of LLMs in the modeling of certain threats. The numerical results and the insights support the necessity for adjusting and fine-tuning LLMs for network security use cases. Future networks, such as Sixth Generation (6G) networks, are envisioned to integrate Artificial Intelligence (AI) into their networks to be AI-Native networks [1] to improve performance, efficiency, and scalability [2].

Aligning AI systems with human privacy preferences requires understanding individuals' nuanced disclosure behaviors beyond general norms. Yet eliciting such boundaries remains challenging due to the context-dependent nature of privacy decisions and the complex trade-offs involved. We present an AI-powered elicitation approach that probes individuals' privacy boundaries through a discriminative task. We conducted a between-subjects study that systematically varied communication roles and delegation conditions, resulting in 1,681 boundary specifications from 169 participants for 61 scenarios. We examined how these contextual factors and individual differences influence the boundary specification. Quantitative results show that communication roles influence individuals' acceptance of detailed and identifiable disclosure, AI delegation and individuals' need for privacy heighten sensitivity to disclosed identifiers, and AI delegation results in less consensus across individuals. Our findings highlight the importance of situating privacy preference elicitation within real-world data flows. We advocate using nuanced privacy boundaries as an alignment goal for future AI systems.

Accurate and transparent financial information disclosure is crucial in the fields of accounting and finance, ensuring market efficiency and investor confidence. Among many information disclosure platforms, the Chinese stock exchanges' investor interactive platform provides a novel and interactive way for listed firms to disclose information of interest to investors through an online question-and-answer (Q&A) format. However, it is common for listed firms to respond to questions with limited or no substantive information, and automatically evaluating the quality of financial information disclosure on large amounts of Q&A pairs is challenging. This paper builds a benchmark FinTruthQA, that can evaluate advanced natural language processing (NLP) techniques for the automatic quality assessment of information disclosure in financial Q&A data. FinTruthQA comprises 6,000 real-world financial Q&A entries and each Q&A was manually annotated based on four conceptual dimensions of accounting. We benchmarked various NLP techniques on FinTruthQA, including statistical machine learning models, pre-trained language model and their fine-tuned versions, as well as the large language model GPT-4. Experiments showed that existing NLP models have strong predictive ability for real question identification and question relevance tasks, but are suboptimal for answer relevance and answer readability tasks. By establishing this benchmark, we provide a robust foundation for the automatic evaluation of information disclosure, significantly enhancing the transparency and quality of financial reporting. FinTruthQA can be used by auditors, regulators, and financial analysts for real-time monitoring and data-driven decision-making, as well as by researchers for advanced studies in accounting and finance, ultimately fostering greater trust and efficiency in the financial markets.

We consider a two-player dynamic information design problem between a principal and a receiver -- a game is played between the two agents on top of a Markovian system controlled by the receiver's actions, where the principal obtains and strategically shares some information about the underlying system with the receiver in order to influence their actions. In our setting, both players have long-term objectives, and the principal sequentially commits to their strategies instead of committing at the beginning. Further, the principal cannot directly observe the system state, but at every turn they can choose randomized experiments to observe the system partially. The principal can share details about the experiments to the receiver. For our analysis we impose the truthful disclosure rule: the principal is required to truthfully announce the details and the result of each experiment to the receiver immediately after the experiment result is revealed. Based on the received information, the receiver takes an action when its their turn, with the action influencing the state of the underlying system. We show that there exist Perfect Bayesian equilibria in this game where both agents play Canonical Belief Based (CBB) strategies using a compressed version of their information, rather than full information, to choose experiments (for the principal) or actions (for the receiver). We also provide a backward inductive procedure to solve for an equilibrium in CBB strategies.

We consider linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) games in which players have quadratic payoffs that depend on the players' actions and an unknown payoff-relevant state, and signals on the state that follow a Gaussian distribution conditional on the state realization. An information designer decides the fidelity of information revealed to the players in order to maximize the social welfare of the players or reduce the disagreement among players' actions. Leveraging the semi-definiteness of the information design problem, we derive analytical solutions for these objectives under specific LQG games. We show that full information disclosure maximizes social welfare when there is a common payoff-relevant state, when there is strategic substitutability in the actions of players, or when the signals are public. Numerical results show that as strategic substitution increases, the value of the information disclosure increases. When the objective is to induce conformity among players' actions, hiding information is optimal. Lastly, we consider the information design objective that is a weighted combination of social welfare and cohesiveness of players' actions. We obtain an interval for the weights where full information disclosure is optimal under public signals for games with strategic substitutability. Numerical solutions show that the actual interval where full information disclosure is optimal gets close to the analytical interval obtained as substitution increases.

We consider linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) network games in which agents have quadratic payoffs that depend on their individual and neighbors' actions, and an unknown payoff-relevant state. An information designer determines the fidelity of information revealed to the agents about the payoff state to maximize the social welfare. Prior results show that full information disclosure is optimal under certain assumptions on the payoffs, i.e., it is beneficial for the average individual. In this paper, we provide conditions based on the strength of the dependence of payoffs on neighbors' actions, i.e., competition, under which a rational agent is expected to benefit, i.e., receive higher payoffs, from full information disclosure. We find that all agents benefit from information disclosure for the star network structure when the game is symmetric and submodular or supermodular. We also identify that the central agent benefits more than a peripheral agent from full information disclosure unless the competition is strong and the number of peripheral agents is small enough. Despite the fact that all agents expect to benefit from information disclosure ex-ante, a central agent can be worse-off from information disclosure in many realizations of the payoff state under strong competition, indicating that a risk-averse central agent can prefer uninformative signals ex-ante.

The term"dox" is an abbreviation for"documents," and doxing is the act of disclosing private, sensitive, or personally identifiable information about a person without their consent. Sensitive information can be considered as any type of confidential information or any information that can be used to identify a person uniquely. This information is called doxed information and includes demographic information [53] such as birthday, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, and religion, or location information which can be used to precisely or approximately locate a person such as the street address, ZIP code, IP address, and GPS coordinates. Other categories of doxed information are identity documents like passport number and social security number, contact information like phone number and email address, financial information such as credit card and bank account details, or sign-in credentials such as usernames and passwords[15]. Such disclosure may have various consequences. It may encourage forms of bigotry and hate groups, encourage human or child trafficking and endanger people's lives or reputations, scare and intimidate people by swatting

Microscopic epidemic models are powerful tools for government policy makers to predict and simulate epidemic outbreaks, which can capture the impact of individual behaviors on the macroscopic phenomenon. However, existing models only consider simple rule-based individual behaviors, limiting their applicability. This paper proposes a deep-reinforcement-learning-powered microscopic model named Microscopic Pandemic Simulator (MPS). By replacing rule-based agents with rational agents whose behaviors are driven to maximize rewards, the MPS provides a better approximation of real world dynamics. To efficiently simulate with massive amounts of agents in MPS, we propose Scalable Million-Agent DQN (SMADQN). The MPS allows us to efficiently evaluate the impact of different government strategies. This paper first calibrates the MPS against real-world data in Allegheny, US, then demonstratively evaluates two government strategies: information disclosure and quarantine. The results validate the effectiveness of the proposed method. As a broad impact, this paper provides novel insights for the application of DRL in large scale agent-based networks such as economic and social networks.

Karni and Vierø's requirement does Modica and Rustichini 1994; Modica and Rustichini 1999; not seem appropriate for many situations of interest, especially Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2006; Board and Chung 2009; for introspective agents, who may believe that the Sillari 2008).) Most work on awareness thus far has focused mere existence of ϕ is itself informative about the world-- on the static case, where awareness does not change. The so becoming aware of ϕ changes beliefs about other propositions.

This paper studies the benefit for information providers in free public information disclosure in settings where the prospective information buyers are people. The underlying model, which applies to numerous real-life situations, considers a standard decision making setting where the decision maker is uncertain about the outcomes of her decision. The information provider can fully disambiguate this uncertainty and wish to maximize her profit from selling such information. We use a series of AMT-based experiments with people to test the benefit for the information provider from reducing some of the uncertainty associated with the decision maker's problem, for free. Free information disclosure of this kind can be proved to be ineffective when the buyer is a fully-rational agent. Yet, when it comes to people we manage to demonstrate that a substantial improvement in the information provider's profit can be achieved with such an approach. The analysis of the results reveals that the primary reason for this phenomena is people's failure to consider the strategic nature of the interaction with the information provider. Peoples' inability to properly calculate the value of information is found to be secondary in its influence.